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7. This question was considered by the Oversea Defence Committee at their 272nd Meeting held on the 29th October, 1926. The Committee are unanimously of opinion that, from the point of view of Hong Kong, it is very desirable that some steps should be taken to deal with the Bias Bay pirates, who are inflicting much injury on the trade of the Colony.
They recognise, however, that it is for His Majesty's Government to decile whether British forces should be permitted to take action for this purpose on Chinese territory,
8. The Committee are informed that the Foreign Office, while concurring in the desirability of checking piracy in Bias Bay, take the view that everything possible should be done to force the Chinese authorities to take action in the matter and to avoid action by British troops on Chinese soil, since the latter might result The Foreign in propaganda throughout China to the detriment of British interests.
First, Office suggest, therefore, that action should be considered in three stages. the Canton Government should be informed that unless they take immediate action for the suppression of piracy in Bias Bay, His Majesty's Government may be forced to do so; secondly, in the event of no action being taken by Canton, naval action, not involving actual landing on Chinese soil, should be attempted; and, thirdly, if naval action is ineffective, a plan on the lines suggested by the Governor of Hong Kong, or as amended by the Acting Consul-General, Canton, should be considered.
The Foreign Office have submitted to the Committee the draft of a telegram (Appendix VI), which it has been suggested should be sent to the British Minister, Peking.
9. The Admiralty take the view that the Foreign Office proposals for the Navy to patrol Bias Bay would involve a large operation owing to the extent of the Bay; that probably three craft would have to be permanently employed on the patrol, and that even then the plan was unlikely to be effective While recognising that it might not be possible to capture the pirates themselves, they are of opinion that the destruction of their headquarters and organisation might produce the desired result, and for this reason they consider that a plan on the lines suggested by the Governor of Hong Kong is the only solution to the problem.
10. The War Office, while agreeing that the naval patrol of the coast (which the Foreign Office considered should not involve bombardment of the piratical villages), 18 unlikely to be effective, take the view that owing to the limited military resources of Hong Kong and the very large extent of the coast line of Bias Bay, the occupation. suggested by the Acting Consul-General, Canton (Appendix IV), is not practicable. The area that could be occupied would be so small that it would probably have no effect whatever on the operations of the pirates. In this connection the Committee note that in paragraph 5 of his despatch dated the 28th August, 1926 (Appendix II', the Governor of Hong Kong suggests that steps must be taken to make the pirate bases in Bias Bay and in the Canton River delta unsafe as centres for piratical operations. It would, therefore, appear that the Governor does not contemplate limiting his action to Bias Bay alone,
The War Office also doubt whether the combined naval and military expedition suggested by the Governor does not involve an alteration of the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to China described in C.1.D. Paper No. 727-B, dated the 15th October, 1926, as follows :—
The policy of His Majesty's Government is therefore to avoid being drawn into intervention in Chinese affairs on a large scale, and to pursue as far as possible a policy of patience and conciliation. This being so, they consider that armed action should be confined to the defence of British lives, property ani interests by whomsoever attacked, provided that such action is easily practicable and will not involve extensive and incalculable military commitments."
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11. The Air Ministry are strongly opposed to air action against the pirate villages, as suggested by the Commodore, Hong Kong, in Enclosure No. 3 to Appendix They are of the opinion that it would be impossible to avoid inflicting damage on| innocent persons, and suggest that this would result in charges of barbarous and inhuman conduct which might damage our prestige.
The Committee are fully in agreement with this view.
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12. In conclusion, the Committee submit that it is for His Majesty's Government to decide whether British forces may undertake punitive action against Chinese pirates on Chinese soil, and whether representations to the Canton Government regarding piracy in Bias Bay need be dependent on the preparation of a plan for such punitive action.
They further suggest that, if the decision of His Majesty's Government is favourable to action by British forces, the following suggestions should receive consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence:-
(1.) That before any action by British forces is undertaken the Canton Government should be requested to take immediate and effective steps for the suppression of piracy in Bias Bay, and should be informed that if this is not done His Majesty's Government may be forced to take action. They farther suggest that the nature of the action contemplated should not be divalged, and that in view of the fact that many ships, though not British owned, have British masters and serve British interests, action should be permissible in any case where British interests are known to be involved.
(2.) That if the above course is agreed to, it is essential that a plan of British action should be framed by the local authorities in Hong Kong and approved by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry without delay. Further, it is suggested that the plan adopted must conform to the existing naval and military resources of Hong Kong, and should be such as to cause as little adverse comment as possible among responsible Chinese authorities.
(3) That, occupation of Bias Bay being impracticable owing to the area involved, purely naval action being unlikely to be effective, and air action being undesirable owing to the risk of damage to innocent persons, the only plan that might produce the desired result is one generally on the lines suggested by the (lovernor of Hong Kong in his despatch of the 30th June, 1926.
(4.) That the presence of Chinese troops and authorities when the operation takes place is hardly feasible, as swift action would appear essential if success is to be achieved. In this connection the Committee invite attention to the telegram from Peking (Appendix V), in which the British Minister suggests that co-operation by any Northern Chinese man-of-war would be more likely to antagonise Canton than isolated action taken by ourselves. (5.) That the Foreign Office draft telegram (Appendix VI) should be considered in the light of the decisions reached on the points mentioned above, (6) That, as the Foreign Office consider that the most careful consideration should be given to questions of international law and general policy that might be affected by punitive action by British troops in China, any plan that may be considered feasible should not be finally approved without further reference to that Department.
(Signed)
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
November 8, 1926.
G. N. MACREADY, Secretary,
Oversea Defence Committee.
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